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Elasticity of Student Quality 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
The hierarchical nature of higher education, in which schools compete in small enclaves for the 
best students, and competition for higher rankings among private, non-profit liberal arts colleges 
has prompted some schools to drastically increase their tuition in order to correspond with the 
price changes of rival institutions.  Since top liberal arts schools operate with sizable excess 
demand for enrollment spots, significant tuition alterations generally do not affect the quantity of 
enrolled students at these schools.  However, the extent to which increases in tuition affect the 
quality of enrolled students has not been thoroughly examined.  This study directly analyzes the 
sensitivity of student quality to a change in tuition.  This analysis includes the development of a 
theoretical model that relates student quality to price by maximizing the educational reputation 
of a non-profit, liberal arts college subject to its tuition revenue minus its cost of operation.  This 
model is used to derive an equation for the price elasticity of student quality and then is tested 
empirically by measuring the effect of tuition changes on student quality.  The results show a 
more significant negative relationship between full tuition and student quality for lower ranked 
schools.  
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I. Introduction 
 
In 2004, the University of Richmond, a private, non-profit liberal arts college, 
decided to raise the total cost of attendance for its 2005-06 first-year students by 27 
percent.  As an institution that is primarily concerned with maximizing its reputation, it is 
safe to assume that one of the objectives of this price modification was to enhance the 
quality of the university and its incoming students.  While it is easy to see how additional 
revenue could be used to enhance the academic quality of a school’s faculty and physical 
resources, it is more difficult to discern how an increase in net tuition affects the 
enrollment decisions of students.  Some studies speculate that enrollment may be 
positively related to tuition.  Rapidly rising prices at private institutions in the 1980’s, 
characterized by a nominal growth of 106 percent between 1981 and 1989, were met with 
increased enrollment applications at many selective schools.  Some have hypothesized 
that this was due, in part, to full tuition amounts acting as a signal of quality.  Not 
wanting to lower their actual or perceived quality, private college presidents had little 
reason to keep their prices down; the worst thing a president could do during this time 
was to lower tuition relative to that of a less prestigious university (Breneman (1994), 
p.32-33).   
More recently, in an article relating college tuition and enrollment figures, 
Jonathan Glater and Alan Finder (2004) discuss the growing trend of colleges to sharply 
increase their tuition in order to stay competitive with schools of comparable quality.  
Many schools use a “follow the price leader” model when making tuition decisions in 
which colleges competing in the same market for student quality tend to make pricing 
decisions based on the school that has the highest tuition within their market enclave.  
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Ultimately, the authors of the article contend that higher tuition accompanied by more 
applicants at universities may be the result of families associating price with quality or 
consumers being generally attracted to an education that is subsidized by aid in the form 
of scholarships and grants.1  However, the authors do not discuss the wider implications 
of increasing prices, namely the effects it has on student quality. 
While some universities may find pricing policies aimed at increasing their 
applicant base to be effective, economists are generally split over whether changes in 
tuition lead to significant changes in enrollment figures.  Studies by Epple, Romano and 
Sieg (2006) and Leslie and Brinkman (1987) conclude that because the market for higher 
education is so competitive, even small changes in tuition lead to relatively large changes 
in enrollment.  Contrarily, O’Connell and Perkins (2003) and Clotfelter (1991) infer that 
because liberal arts colleges operate with so much excess demand, any reasonable 
increase in tuition would not be accompanied by a decrease in applicants or enrollment. 
These studies comment on how the quantity of student enrollment is affected by price, 
but say nothing about how price affects the quality of these students.    
The objective of this study will be to directly examine the sensitivity of student 
quality in higher education to a change in tuition.  This analysis includes the development 
of a theoretical model that estimates the effect of price on student quality by maximizing 
the educational reputation of a non-profit, liberal arts college subject to its tuition revenue 
minus its cost of operation.  The price elasticity of student quality of an institution is then 
measured empirically by using average SAT scores and the percent of incoming students 
who graduated in the top ten percent of their high school class as measures of student 
                                                 
1 "In Tuition Game, Popularity Rises With Price." New York Times 12 Dec. 2006. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/12/education/12tuition.html>. 
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quality at different non-profit, liberal arts colleges across the hierarchical educational 
industry.   
 
II. Literature Review 
Numerous scholarly papers have presented theoretical models and conducted 
empirical studies in order to describe tuition pricing and enrollment decisions within 
higher education.  However, it is more difficult to find studies that directly examine the 
effect of a change in tuition price on the quality of enrolling students.  Hoenack and 
Weiler (1975) explore tuition policy and whether price elasticity of student quality is 
significant.  Choosing to sample one liberal arts Ph.D. program and one professional 
program (programs they observe having sizable excess demand), they hypothesize that 
tuition could be allowed to increase without significantly sacrificing student quality.  
Using data from the University of Minnesota in 1971-1972, they estimate the effect of a 
50 percent tuition increase and find that student quality is mostly unresponsive to a 
change in price, but they do not rule out the possible substantial effect of tuition changes 
on demand by students of comparable quality. 
Dolan, Schmidt, and Jung (1985) use a three-equation simultaneous model to 
examine the institutional production of higher education in order to identify the 
implications of institutional resource allocation.  In their empirical model, student quality 
is treated endogenously and is measured as the median composite SAT score of the 1981 
freshmen class at 174 private undergraduate institutions.  They find a significant, 
negative effect of scholarships (aid) on student quality and a positive relationship 
between student quality and tuition.  The seemingly perverse nature of these findings 
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suggests, as explicated by the authors, that less prestigious universities are relatively 
unsuccessful at attracting quality students through aid and that tuition may be perceived 
as an index of institutional quality.                 
 Nicholson (1995) expands upon the ideas of Newhouse (1970), who examines the 
nature of the non-profit hospital by jointly maximizing its quantity and quality of service 
subject to its costs, and provides a basic theoretical framework for constrained utility 
maximization of a non-profit organization.  Nicholson assumes that non-profit firms 
make decisions which afford maximum utility to their managers and administration.  He 
maximizes a two-variable utility function, in which both variables are assumed to have 
positive but diminishing marginal utility, subject to a zero-profit budget constraint.  The 
Lagrangian maximization yields an equation that sets the ratio of the marginal utility of 
the first variable to the marginal utility of the second variable equal to the ratio of the net 
marginal cost of each variable.  Since the marginal utilities of both variables are assumed 
to be positive, the marginal cost of each variable is greater than its respective marginal 
revenue.  Nicholson concludes that non-profit organizations expand production beyond 
profit-maximizing levels, diminishing their own profits, in order to maximize utility.        
White and Rothschild (1995) focus on developing a theoretical model that 
concentrates on educational technology of various inputs and outputs in order to examine 
tuition pricing.  They note that students in higher education are inputs into the 
educational process as well as recipients of educational services known as human capital 
output.  Assuming that students only care about the amount of human capital they receive 
and the amount of tuition they pay, White and Rothschild’s model maximizes the amount 
of human capital output allocated to each student subject to the amount of general 
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resources available at a given non-profit university.  Thus, tuition is equal to the human 
capital increment per student.  Breneman (1994) uses a similar model that maximizes 
education inputs, accounting for a school’s size and prestige, subject to various revenue 
sources and costs.  Wetzel (1998), on the contrary, concludes that the nature of the 
competition in higher education is too complex to model holistically.  He insists that 
enrollment demand models must be specific to each institution of higher education to 
obtain meaningful insight.     
The preponderance of papers concerning the market for higher education mention 
the effect of price elasticity of student demand in determining tuition.  An early and 
influential study of estimating student responsiveness to price was conducted by Schultz 
(1963).  Schultz’s study, which was essential to the development of educational 
economics, was one of the first to examine the returns to investments in human capital to 
estimate the demand for higher education.  Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2006) use 
enrollment and tuition data from 768 private universities and colleges in the United States 
for the academic year 1995-1996 to test the effect of tuition on attendance.  They 
conclude that even small changes in tuition lead to relatively large changes in enrollment.  
Along these same lines, Leslie and Brinkman (1987), Becker (1990), and McPherson and 
Schapiro (1991) find that there exists an inverse relationship between attendance and cost 
of enrollment in institutions of higher education.  Allen and Shen (1999) agree, 
concluding that there is a negative association between tuition price and student demand.    
Other studies have found that a change in tuition price does not significantly 
affect enrollment.  O’Connell and Perkins (2003) study 138 designated liberal arts 
colleges to see how price, cost, and reputation affect enrollment decisions.  They 
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conclude that because liberal arts colleges operate with so much excess demand, any 
reasonable increase in tuition would not be accompanied by a decrease in applicants or 
enrollment.  Similarly, Clotfelter (1991) looked at a sample of 24 highly selective 
institutions of higher education from 1981-1988 and reached the same conclusion. 
Epple, Figlio, and Romano (2004) and Hoxby (1997) show that the changing 
competitive market structure has led American schools to raise their tuition and attract 
students of greater ability.  Both studies generally only note this correlation and do not 
mention any kind of causation between tuition and student quality.  In another analysis of 
the market for higher education, Winston (1999) contends that universities operate in a 
very hierarchical industry based on selectivity.  Thus, universities compete only within 
small market sectors for enrollment.   
Following this idea, Monks and Ehrenberg (1999) show that universities with 
different reputations are affected differently by various exogenous variables.  In a study 
of the impact of U.S. News and World Report college rankings on enrollment and pricing 
policies, Monks and Ehrenberg find the effect of an increase in rank on admittance rates 
and yields is a decrease in the average SAT score of the school’s incoming freshmen 
class.  Notably, he finds that this effect is larger for higher ranking schools and less 
pronounced for lower ranking schools.  This “effect discrepancy” among universities 
implies that the top ranked schools compete in separate market enclaves, as determined 
by rank, for student quality.  While there are many studies and theoretical models that 
aim to determine price elasticity of demand of students in higher education, this study is 
unique in that it will theoretically predict and empirically examine the sensitivity of 
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student quality to a change in tuition for different market enclaves in the higher education 
industry. 
 
III. Theoretical Model  
In modeling the market for higher education from the perspective of a non-profit 
liberal arts college, it is important to specify what exactly the university is attempting to 
maximize.  For the purpose of this study, a university will attempt to maximize its 
educational reputation, which will be considered a function of enrolled student quality 
and faculty quality.  In particular, this study will be examining the effect of a change in 
net tuition price on student quality by deriving the price elasticity of student quality.  This 
will be accomplished by modeling the reputation of a university, which will exclude any 
quality attributed to the institution from sports, social life, quality of life or any other 
potential factor that may contribute to a university’s reputation.2  It is important to note 
that students are inputs into the reputation function but only affect educational reputation 
as enrolled students (in many cases reputation takes into account production externalities 
and human capital output of students).  Thus, the reputation of a school can be enhanced 
by a student only if that student raises the academic prestige of the university.  Ignoring 
any non-tuition revenue, the budget constraint to a non-profit university’s reputation 
maximization will be the revenue raised from tuition after costs of operation have been 
subtracted.  It will also be assumed that a university will attempt to increase its reputation 
until its profits are equal to zero.  Therefore, the maximization equation for a college 
takes the form: 
                                                 
2 While it may be argued that the reputation of a university is a function of more than just student and 
faculty quality, the solution derived for the two-variable case also holds true for the n-variable case.  
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(i)  
F*Pq* (S)P  q*T(S)
subject to
F) R(S,  R max
F S +=
=
where R is the reputation function, S is average student quality and F is average faculty 
quality.  The budget equation follows the zero-profit constraint of non-profit liberal arts 
colleges by equating total revenue and total cost.  Total revenue is the full tuition price 
per student, T, multiplied by the quantity of incoming students, q.  Total cost is a function 
of quantity of incoming students and faculty quality multiplied by their average prices 
which are  and  respectively.  For the purpose of this model, the quantity of 
incoming students is assumed to be fixed as most liberal arts colleges have enough excess 
demand to fill enrollment openings.  Lewis and Winston (1997) note that nearly all 
students receive some amount of subsidy for their education in the form of aid.  Given 
that the presence of high quality students is particularly beneficial to a university’s 
reputation, it is assumed that these students may be entitled to tuition discounts in the 
form of merit aid.  Conceptually, the price of a student can be thought of as the average 
amount of merit and financial aid awarded.  Each student’s tuition is therefore equal to 
the full amount of tuition (or sticker price) as determined by the university, minus any aid 
he or she receives. 
SP FP
 It is assumed that the variables of the reputation function, S and F, tend to 
increase a university’s reputation.  Furthermore, the interaction of the two inputs, 
represented by the mixed partial derivative of the reputation function with respect to 
student and faculty quality, increases reputation.  This can be written as: 
(ii)  = SR
S
R
∂
∂ > 0,   FR  = 
F
R
∂
∂ > 0,    = SFR
FS
R2
∂∂
∂ > 0 
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in which  represents the marginal reputation of student quality and  is the marginal 
reputation of faculty quality.
SR FR
3  The positive value of  reflects the complementary 
nature of student and faculty quality in the production of reputation.
SFR
4  However, it is also 
assumed that the variables S and F increase the reputation function at a decreasing rate.  
This can be described as: 
(iii)  = SSR 2
2
S
R
∂
∂ < 0,  FFR  = 2
2
F
R
∂
∂  < 0 
  
The Lagrangian function of a university can be represented by: 
(iv) L(λ) =  + λ (F) R(S, F*Pq*(S)P  q*T(S) F S −− )         
and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are: 
 
(v) 
S
L
∂
∂  =  + λ (  – ) SR SMR SMC ≤  0           S  0        and        S * ≥
S
L
∂
∂  = 0      
 
F
L
∂
∂  = FR  + λ (–   0                         F  0        and        F * FP ) ≤ ≥
F
L
∂
∂  = 0 
 
λ
L
∂
∂  = T * q – Ps * q – * F  0            λ  0        and        λ * FP ≥ ≥
λ
L
∂
∂  = 0    
where MC is marginal cost and MR is marginal revenue, both in terms of student quality.  
Assuming that the maximization problem does not yield a corner solution, a university’s 
reputation maximization will involve some amount of both student quality and faculty 
quality.  Also, given the presence of a binding constraint (total revenue must equal total 
cost for non-profit liberal arts colleges), the Lagrange multiplier (λ) must take on a 
positive, fixed value and can be interpreted as the marginal reputation of revenue.                     
  
                                                 
3 By Clairaut’s Theorem,  > 0.  FSR
4 That is to say an increase in faculty quality increases the marginal reputation of student quality.  For 
example, better faculty can utilize student quality more efficiently to increase reputation.    
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Solving for the marginal revenue and marginal cost of student quality from the total 
revenue and total cost equations results in: 
(vi) MRs = q * 
S
T
∂
∂   0≠
  
(vii) MCs = q * 
S
Ps
∂
∂   0≠
where / and /  are T∂ S∂ Ps∂ S∂ non-zero because it is assumed that a university can 
exhibit some price control and that the supply curve of student quality is not infinitely 
elastic.  Rearranging the Lagrangian equation so that total revenue is equal to quantity of 
students multiplied by net tuition (full tuition minus the average price paid to students) 
and differentiating with respect to student quality gives the first order Langrangian 
condition:       
(viii) Rs = – λ * q * 
S
Ps)-(T
∂
∂        
Solving equation (viii) in accordance with the Implicit Function Theorem5 for how 
student quality changes with a change in net tuition and substituting FR /  for λ (solved 
from the first order Langrangian condition with respect to faculty quality) 
FP
gives: 
(ix) 
Ps)-T(
S
∂
∂  = – 
Rs*P
q*R
F
F   
Then, in order to get an elasticity equation, equation (ix) is multiplied by (T - Ps)/S to 
yield: 
(x) 
Ps)-T(
S
∂
∂ * 
S
Ps)-(T    = – 
Rs*P
q*R
F
F * 
S
Ps)-(T  
                                                 
5 The Inverse Function Theorem implies that if 
S
Ps)-(T
∂
∂
 = –
q*λ
Rs , then 
Ps)-(T
S
∂
∂  =  –
Rs
q*λ .   
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Equation (x) measures the net tuition elasticity of student quality and has a few important 
implications regarding the nature of elasticity at schools with different amounts of student 
quality and net price.  Since q and  are fixed in the short run, the magnitude of a 
school’s price elasticity of student quality varies directly with net tuition and inversely 
with amount of student quality.  All variables in this equation are positive, therefore, 
student quality is negatively affected by an increase in net tuition.  Furthermore, schools 
that charge relatively large net tuition prices experience greater price elasticity than 
cheaper schools. Also, a school that enjoys a relatively large amount of student quality is 
predicted to have student quality amounts that are less price elastic (responsive), that is to 
say an increase in net tuition would lead to a relatively small decrease in student quality.  
Similarly, student quality at schools that have relatively low amounts of student quality is 
expected to be more price elastic.  The marginal reputation ratio of faculty to student 
quality ( / ) is different across schools but its value should not affect the price 
elasticity of student quality as schools with different levels of student quality may very 
well have similar marginal reputation ratios.            
FP
FR SR
Based on the hypothesized inverse relationship between price and quality, this 
theory is meant to represent the basic enrollment and pricing choices of students and 
private, non-profit liberal arts colleges, respectively.  Although a key assumption of 
equation (x) is that student quality responds to net tuition levels, a similar outcome is 
produced when the full tuition elasticity of student quality is derived.6  This study 
attempts to establish the elasticity of student quality with respect to price, and to 
determine if, in fact, the student quality response is the same with respect to full tuition 
                                                 
6 Assuming that =∂
∂
Ps
S  –
T
S
∂
∂ , 
T
S
∂
∂ * 
S
T = – 
Rs*P
q*R*2
F
F
* 
S
T  
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and net tuition at schools of different quality.  The extent to which student quality is 
observed to be influenced by price will determine the nature and magnitude of student 
quality control that schools can exhibit.  
 
IV. Data 
 The cohort of schools analyzed in this study is the top 50 private, non-profit 
liberal arts colleges as ranked by U.S. News and World Report (USNWR) in 2008.7  
Annual data were extracted from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System 
(IPEDS), The Chronicle of Higher Education (TCHE), and USNWR for the academic 
years 1996/1997 through 2006/2007.  The academic year 1999/2000 was excluded as 
IPEDS does not provide any institutional data during this period.  Descriptive statistics of 
all variables included in the analysis can be found on Table 1.  A liberal arts college, as 
defined by the 2006 Basic version of Carnegie Classifications, is an institution that 
emphasizes undergraduate education and awards at least half of its degrees in liberal arts 
disciplines.8  These institutions are observed as having sizable excess demand for 
enrollment and thus are able to meet incoming student quotas (in terms of quantity) 
regardless of tuition alterations.   
 Data measuring student quality and relative overall quality of a university were 
taken from the annual “America’s Best Colleges” issue of USNWR.  The percentage of 
incoming freshmen that were in the top ten percent of their high school class (Top 10) 
was taken directly from USNWR whereas an institution’s average SAT score of the 
                                                 
7 The U.S. Naval Academy and U.S. Military Academy were excluded because they are public schools.   
8 Before 2000, a liberal arts college was defined as one that awarded 40 percent of its degrees in liberal arts 
subjects. 
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incoming freshman class is the average of its 25th and 75th percentile scores.9  Average 
SAT scores ranged from 1150 to 1485 and Top 10 data ranged from 22 percent to 94 
percent.  The rankings provided by USNWR were adjusted to account for the 
reclassification of liberal arts colleges and variability of an institution’s rank over the 
years.  If the USNWR rank of a school was greater than 40 or not included in the liberal 
arts category, then it was assigned a rank of 41.  The top 40 schools each year were 
assigned their rank (RANK) and those with a rank of 41 were assigned a rank of zero.  
The average rank of these schools was approximately 15.  Then, a dichotomous variable 
(RANKNOT) was introduced and set equal to one for schools ranked outside the top 40 
and zero for those within the top 40 in a given year.  This dummy variable was included 
in order to measure the effect on student quality of dropping out the top 40 schools.  The 
descriptive statistics show that schools in the sample were not ranked within the top 40 
roughly 23 percent of the time.  The lagged (previous year’s) USNWR rank was inserted 
for each academic year in the data set because students are usually required to accept 
admission in April in order to matriculate in the fall (and thus make enrollment decisions 
based on rank information from the year before they enter school).  All else being equal, 
students attempt to maximize the quality of school they attend.  Therefore, both RANK 
and RANKNOT are predicted to inversely affect student quality as a higher rank number 
(worse ranking) would attract less quality students the next academic year.    
 All tuition and student aid data were found online using IPEDS.  The variable for 
annual full price of attendance was created using tuition, fee, room and board amounts of 
full-time, in-state undergraduate students living on campus (TFRB).  The TFRB of each 
school ranged from $23,907 to $44,632 over the ten years.  Two different variables were 
                                                 
9 All ACT scores were converted to SAT scores. 
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used to represent average net tuition, which is defined as the difference between full 
tuition and the average amount of student aid given by a school.  Student aid information 
was only available from IPEDS for the academic years 2000/2001 though 2004/2005 and 
is comprised of institutional, federal and state and local grant aid.  Average student aid 
was calculated by multiplying the percent of full-time, first-time undergraduate students 
who received aid by the average amount of aid received.  The amount of student aid 
received varied from $3,938.08 to $16,288.65.  Student-loan aid was also included in the 
average student aid calculation for one of the two net tuition variables and was assumed 
to provide a subsidy of half the face value of the loan.10  The average subsidy provided 
by student loans was equal to $806.07.  The predicted sign for all three tuition variables 
negative as it is assumed, for now, that the top 50 liberal arts schools are similar enough 
to be considered substitutes in student consumption and thus, ceteris paribus, a relatively 
high tuition should discourage quality students from enrolling.
is 
                                                
11          
 Endowment per student (ENDPS) was calculated by dividing a university’s 
endowment, which was accessed online from TCHE, as of the beginning of each 
academic year by the corresponding full-time equivalent undergraduate enrollment of the 
university as reported by IPEDS.12  ENDPS reflects the ability of a school to enhance its 
reputation and draw quality students and varied largely across schools (from $46,497.41 
to $962, 291.11). ENDPS was lagged one year and its predicted sign is positive.  Year 
dichotomous variables are incorporated to account for student quality changes that are 
 
10 Bosworth et al. (1987) and Hauptman (1985) find the subsidy value of a student-loan to be worth 
approximately 50 percent of the original value of the loan. 
11 Dolan et al. (1985) note that tuition may positively affect student quality if different tuitions are an 
indication of “real or perceived quality differences” that are not reflected in other variables. 
12 For the 2002/2003 academic year, full-time equivalent undergraduate enrollment was not reported and 
was estimated by averaging the data from 2001/2002 and 2003/2004.   
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consistent across highly ranked liberal arts schools.  Institutional dichotomous variables 
are used to capture the effect of each school’s fixed reputation.13  The aforementioned 
endowment and tuition variables were converted to real terms based on the year 2006 
using the annual CPI for all major expenditure class items.                   
 
V. Regression 
The estimation method chosen to model student quality was a least squares 
regression with institution level fixed effects.  This technique was utilized in order to 
look at the change in student quality within schools over time while accounting for fixed 
institution and year effects.  Two different measures of student quality, the percentage of 
incoming freshmen who were in the top ten percent of their high school class (Top 10) 
and the average institutional SAT scores, are employed as dependent variables in the 
regression analyses.  The objective of this model is to calculate price elasticity of student 
quality.  This elasticity measures a percent change in student quality for a percent change 
in price, which can be written as: 
P%
SQ%
Δ
Δ=SQE  
where SQ is student quality and P is price.  The value of the elasticity describes the 
degree of responsiveness of student quality with respect to price.  A greater value of the 
elasticity signifies that student quality is more elastic (responsive) to price.  An elasticity 
that is less than one and greater than zero means that student quality is price inelastic 
(relatively unresponsive) whereas a value greater than one means that it is price elastic.  
                                                 
13 This amount of reputation can be thought of as the inherent amount of prestige a school has that does not 
change with time. 
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The student quality, tuition and endowment per student variables were changed to 
logarithmic form in order observe elasticities in the regression outputs.       
The independent variables used to model student quality in the final regressions 
were chosen based upon theoretical justification, adjusted R² in the model, statistical 
significance, plausibility of positive or negative affect on student quality, and 
magnitude.14  Included in the models, henceforth referred to as the SAT model and the 
Top 10 model, are the variables of full tuition (TFRB), RANK, RANKNOT, and ENDPS.   
The double-log models of student quality are given below: 
itti
ititititit ENDPSRANKNOTRANKTFRBSAT
ευδ
βββββ
+++
++++= −−− ))(ln()()())(ln(   )ln( 1413121  0  
itti
ititititit ENDPSRANKNOTRANKTFRBTOP
ευδ
βββββ
+++
++++= −−− ))(ln()()())(ln(   )10ln( 1413121  0
 
in which i denotes institution, t is year, iδ  represents institutional fixed effects, and tυ  is 
year effects.   
In order to measure elasticities across different markets based on rank, the cohort 
of schools under examination will first be assumed to compete in the same market and 
then will be divided into two equal groups based on average rank over the ten years under 
examination.  An investigation of the empirical output including all schools shows that 
both models contain independent variables with high explanatory power of student 
quality.  Table 2 and Table 3 give the regression output for the SAT and Top 10 models, 
respectively.  The SAT model yields an adjusted R² value of 0.93 and one significant 
variable.  When included in the SAT model, the coefficient on endowment per student is 
not only statistically insignificant but also has the opposite sign of what had been 
                                                 
14 LIMDEP 8.0 was used to perform the regression analysis.  
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predicted.  Therefore, analyzing the results of the SAT model without endowment per 
student seems most appropriate.  Most notably in the SAT model, the coefficient of the 
full tuition variable is -0.045 and significant at the 10 percent level.  As this data was 
transformed by the natural log function, it now measures a percentage change in average 
SAT score for a given percentage change in full tuition.  Thus, a one percent increase in 
full tuition corresponds to a -0.045 percent decrease in average SAT score.  The negative 
correlation between full tuition level and SAT implies that some quality students are 
deterred from enrolling at schools with high tuition although, on the whole, SAT scores 
are shown to be very price inelastic.   
A surprising aspect of the SAT model is the apparent insignificance of the rank 
coefficients on the average SAT score of incoming students.  Monks and Ehrenberg 
(1999) find that an increase in rank number (worse ranking) leads to a decline in an 
institution’s average SAT score on the order of 2.8 points for every one place moved.  
The inconsequentiality of rank on SAT average in this study may suggest that inherent 
(non-time variant) institutional reputation is more important to prospective students then 
year to year measures of school quality.  It also may be, though, that the insignificance of 
rank in this regression is due to missing variables in the data set or the fact that the 
selection of the school sample was based on 2008 rankings.   
 Much like the SAT model, the Top 10 model yields a high adjusted R² value 
(0.83) and theoretically expected results.  As anticipated, the sign of the coefficient on the 
full tuition variable is negative but the coefficient itself is not found to be significant at 
the 10 percent level, implying the effect of full tuition on Top 10 is trivial (Top 10 is very 
price inelastic).  The dummy variable of being ranked outside of the top 40 is both 
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significant at the 5 percent level and negatively correlated with the student quality.  The 
coefficient suggests that dropping out of the top 40 schools would lead to an 8.7 percent 
decrease in Top 10.15  It is interesting to note the more profound effect on Top 10 of 
moving from a ranking of 40 to 41 than from moving from 39 to 40, implying that 
competition for student quality varies across different rank-based groupings.   
 Endowment per student also appears to have a statistically significant (at the 10 
percent level) effect on student quality.  Since the endowment per student data was 
transformed by the natural log function, its coefficient of 0.065 means that a one percent 
increase in endowment per student has the effect of increasing Top 10 by 0.065 percent.  
Although statistically significant, the relatively small magnitude of this coefficient 
suggests that increasing endowment per student does not necessarily correspond to 
significant increases in institutional student quality levels.     
 Since the year 1996 was omitted in both of the models, the positive and increasing 
values of the coefficients on the year variables show that the average SAT scores and Top 
10 values of these 50 liberal arts schools are trending upward with time.16  While this 
may be a result of better students attending the cohort of schools under examination, the 
upward trend likely also reflects the inherent bias of the data.  Data from schools that are 
ranked within the top 50 in 2008 that are not ranked within the top 50 in previous years, 
perhaps due in part to a poor freshman class in terms of average SAT score or high 
school class rank, are not included for the years they are outside of the top 50.  Thus, the 
                                                 
15 As Top 10 is measured in terms of percent, this is a percent decrease, not a percentage point decrease.  
16 Note: Values of Top 10 and average SAT are generally increasing.  Average SAT scores at these schools 
are increasing from 1996 though 2005 but then decline slightly in 2006.  Top 10 increases from 1996 to 
1997, decreases in 1998, and then increases from 2000 through 2006.  
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measures of student quality are biased upward because only data from the years when 
schools are ranked within the top 50 are included. 
 When all of the 50 schools are included in the regression, student quality is shown 
to be very price inelastic.  This suggests that even relatively large increases in full tuition 
will not be accompanied by significant decreases in student quality.  Pooling all 50 
schools, however, assumes that the responsiveness of student quality with respect to price 
is the same among these schools.  As it is unreasonable to assume that a top ranked 
liberal arts college competes directly with a school near the bottom of the rankings, more 
accurate elasticity calculations could be derived if the cohort is broken down into market 
spheres where competition for student quality is more equal among schools.  Therefore, 
schools are divided into two enclaves based on average rank.17  The top 25 schools have 
an average rank ranging from 1.4 to 27.1 and the rank of the bottom 25 schools varies 
from 28.2 to 41.  The top 25 schools have an average SAT score of 1348.90 and average 
TOP 10 of 69.24 percent.  The bottom 25 schools have an average SAT score of 1265.94 
and average Top 10 of 55.33 percent. 
 The regression output for the SAT and Top 10 models of the top 25 schools is 
shown in Table 4 and 5, respectively.  It is interesting to note that the coefficient on full 
tuition in the SAT model is relatively more inelastic compared to the SAT model which 
included all 50 schools. The SAT model shows that the effect of tuition, fee, room and 
board is not statistically different from zero at the 10 percent level.  This signifies that 
average SAT scores at the top 25 schools are very price inelastic.  This result is not 
terribly surprising; the theoretical model suggests that as student quality (and presumably 
                                                 
17 Data limitations and convenience were the main factors in determining the division of the market 
enclaves.  Schools in the top 25 are assumed to have relatively better student quality than lower ranked 
schools.  
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a school’s reputation as determined by its rank) increases, its price elasticity should 
decrease.  A simple explanation for this result stems from the fact that top quality schools 
have very few substitutes in student consumption, and thus the demand for high quality 
schools is relatively inelastic.  It is difficult to compare the Top 10 model’s full tuition 
coefficient for the top 25 schools and all 50 schools because neither is statistically 
significant. 
 The regression results of both models for the bottom 25 colleges, in Table 6 and 
7, further substantiate the theoretical predictions, which state that as student quality 
decreases it should become more price elastic.  The coefficient of full tuition in the SAT 
model is -0.154 and is significant at the 1 percent level.  Thus, a one percent increase in 
sticker price, for example, is predicted to lower average SAT scores by 0.154 percent 
(compared to a decline of -0.045 percent in the 50 school regression).  The Top 10 model 
yields a full tuition coefficient of -0.659 and is significant at the 10 percent level.  A one 
percent increase in full tuition corresponds to a 0.659 percent decrease in Top 10 
(compared to a statistically insignificant coefficient of -0.083 in the 50 school 
regression).  As anticipated, the student quality of the bottom 25 schools is much more 
price elastic.  As a corollary of prior reasoning, this outcome likely reflects the relative 
abundance of less quality schools, the demand for which is more elastic when compared 
to the demand of better schools.  Along these same lines, it may hold that these schools 
are generally regarded as close substitutes.  Therefore, a relatively high tuition would be a 
deterrent to prospective quality students.     
          The net tuition variables (either with or without loans) were substituted as 
measures of price for both the SAT and Top 10 models containing all schools, but were 
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found to be insufficient for two main reasons.  Firstly, the short panel of financial aid data 
available meant that most of the variability found in the regressions that included net 
tuition was attributable to year effects.  Secondly, there was not strong justification for 
the presence of net tuition in the models as the output, found in Tables 8 and 9, showed 
that student quality was not significantly affected by net tuition in eight separate 
regressions.  In the SAT model, the positive coefficients for net tuition with loans and 
without are theoretically implausible and statistically insignificant.  In addition, the 
coefficients on rank, not being ranked, and endowment per student in the regressions of 
this model were found to be of the opposite predicted sign and have no statistically 
significant impact on average SAT score.  These results, taken into consideration with the 
statistically significant inverse relationship between full tuition level and SAT score, may 
reflect the possibility that quality students (as measured by SAT score) respond more to 
the sticker price of an institution than the amount of financial aid they receive.  
When net tuition was used in the Top 10 model, the coefficients did have the 
anticipated signs, but a change in net tuition, rank, not being ranked, or endowment per 
student had no significant effect on the percent of students who graduated in the top 10 
percent of their high school class.  Although the SAT and Top 10 models containing net 
tuition did have higher adjusted R² values than those produced when using full tuition,   
the statistical significance of only the year variables in the net tuition models meant that 
nearly all of the variability in student quality was due to fixed effects.  For these reasons, 
net tuition may not be the best measure of price in these models.      
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VI. Conclusion    
 The aim of this study is to examine the sensitivity of student quality at private, 
non-profit liberal arts colleges to a change in tuition by calculating the price elasticity of 
student quality.  The analyses presented suggest that not only is there a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between price and student quality, but also that 
student quality may very well respond more to changes in full tuition than net tuition.  
Also, the theory that the price elasticity is inversely related to amount of student quality is 
largely corroborated by the regression output.  This means that relatively large tuition 
increases negatively affect lower ranked schools more than higher ranked schools.  When 
comparing the SAT model with data from all 50 schools to the SAT model with just the 
top 25 schools, the price elasticity of student quality becomes more inelastic.  A similar 
comparison of both models containing all 50 schools to the models of just the bottom 25 
schools shows that student quality becomes more price elastic.  In the bottom 25 school 
regressions, the SAT model shows that the full tuition variable becomes about 1 
percentage point more elastic whereas in the Top 10 model the coefficient of full tuition 
becomes roughly 6.6 percentage points more elastic.  These effect discrepancies reinforce 
the presence of market enclaves, where different schools can expect different price 
elasticities of student quality based on rank. 
 Although the SAT models provide the most theoretically plausible results, there 
may be more justification for using the percent of students who graduated in the top 10 
percent of their high school class as a measure of student quality.  Monks and Ehrenberg 
(1999) speculate that the growing popularity and influence of USNWR ranks may give 
schools reason to adjust their self-reported data in order to increase rank.  While both 
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SAT scores and Top 10 levels are self-reported, it may be easier to manipulate the 
parameters that determine which SAT score are reported.  For instance, a school may or 
may not choose to include SAT scores from exchange students or part-time students,   
depending on their affect on the school’s SAT average.    
 Based on the findings of this study, there are certain implications for some 
schools employing the “follow the price leader” model, where schools raise tuitions to 
match those of their competitors.  Universities choose the schools in which they believe 
they are in competition with in order to set prices to vie for student quality in market 
enclaves.  However, problems arise when trying to specify which schools directly 
compete with one another.  In this study, market spheres for liberal arts colleges were 
broken down based on average rank into the top 25 and those ranked 26 through 50.  If 
the original data set analyzed in this study, which included all 50 schools, were 
considered by the schools under examination to be a reasonable market enclave, the 
subsequent regressions would show that price elasticity varies for different schools within 
the same market sphere, meaning similar pricing changes made by schools within the 
same enclave would have different implications for student quality.  In essence, if price 
affects student quality differently for different schools within same market, then the 
“follow the price leader” theory does not hold (in that is does not maximize student 
quality and thus reputation) because schools making similar pricing decisions would see 
significantly different changes in student quality. 
This prompts the question: what determines an enclave?  If enclaves are defined 
as markets in which schools compete equally for student quality, this is a difficult 
question to answer.  It is not unreasonable to believe that market enclaves are established 
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based on rank.  Data limitations and convenience determined the market spheres analyzed 
in this study.  More accurate market enclaves could possibly be derived by giving ranks 
of different years certain weight, rather than just taking the average of all past ranks.18   
However, the year-to-year variability of ranks and extent to which they actually reflect 
the competition for student quality may prove them unreliable for grouping schools.  
Future studies may choose to concentrate on enclaves that factor in other similarities 
between schools that may create competition such as location, quantity of students or 
degree offerings.  It may very well be that accurate measures of price elasticity of student 
quality can only be done on a per school basis.   
Finally, the nature of the double-log model in the regressions may not produce the 
most accurate price elasticities.  The double-log model assumes that the elasticity 
coefficient between student quality and price remains constant regardless of the absolute 
price level, while the theoretical model predicts that the magnitude of the price elasticity 
is directly related to absolute price level.  This discrepancy, though, would only have 
implications for schools within the same enclave that had significantly different levels of 
tuition.         
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 For instance, ranks from more recent years could be given greater weight than older ranks in order to 
reflect current market competition. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Predicted Sign of Variables within the Model 
 
 
Variable  (X) 
 X
S 
∂
∂  Mean and Std. Dev. 
Max 
Min 
Dependent Variables 
Average SAT (S)  1308.12 
69.65 
1485 
1150 
Percent of students who graduated 
in top 10% of high school class (S) 
 62.47 
14.02 
94 
22 
Independent Variables 
Tuition, fee, room and board ($) a 
 
_ 36,847.51 
4,464.26 
44,632.00 
23,907.46 
Net tuition with loans ($) a 
 
_ 25,507.33 
4,105.19 
34,240.06 
11,511.92 
Net tuition without loans ($) a 
 
_ 26,328.86 
4,006.46 
34,835.03 
12,946.30 
Ranked among top 40 liberal arts 
colleges by U.S. News 
_ 14.99 
12.95 
1 
40 
Not ranked among top 40 liberal 
arts colleges dummy variable 
_ 0.23 
0.43 
 
Endowment per student ($) a 
 
+ 261,172.73 
185,134.25 
962,291.11 
46,497.41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a Real monetary value with base year 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28 
 
Table 2: SAT Model with Full Tuition – All Schools 
 
Variable  ln(SAT score – 50th percentile)  
ln(Tuition, fee, room and board) 
 
-0.042* 
(0.031) 
-0.045* 
(0.030) 
Lagged U.S. News rank of top 40 
liberal arts colleges 
-0.0001 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
Dummy of lagged U.S. News 
rank > 40 
-0.005 
(0.009) 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
ln(Endowment per student) 
 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
 
Fixed Effects 
1997 
 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
1998 
 
0.008** 
(0.004) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
2000 
 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
2001 
 
0.020*** 
(0.005) 
0.019*** 
(0.004) 
2002 
 
0.030*** 
(0.005) 
0.029*** 
(0.005) 
2003 
 
0.035*** 
(0.006) 
0.035*** 
(0.006) 
2004 
 
0.043*** 
(0.007) 
0.042*** 
(0.006) 
2005 
 
0.049*** 
(0.008) 
0.049*** 
(0.007) 
2006 0.046*** 
(0.009) 
0.046*** 
(0.008) 
Institutional fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes 
R2 
 
0.94 0.94 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.93 0.93 
Number of observations 
 
424 432 
LM test statistic (end p-value) 919.39 (<0.001) 876.74 (<0.001) 
Notes:   
Standard errors are in parentheses.      
*, **, *** Denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 3:  Top 10 Model with Full Tuition – All Schools 
 
Variable  ln(Percent of students who graduated in the top 
10% of their high school class) 
ln(Tuition, fee, room and board) 
 
-0.083 
(0.236) 
-0.160 
(0.228) 
Lagged U.S. News rank of top 40 
liberal arts colleges 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
Dummy of lagged U.S. News 
rank > 40 
-0.087* 
(0.066) 
-0.080** 
(0.065) 
ln(Endowment per student) 
 
0.065* 
(0.040) 
 
Fixed Effects 
1997 
 
0.031 
(0.025) 
0.039* 
(0.023) 
1998 
 
0.017 
(0.028) 
0.036 
(0.024) 
2000 
 
0.049 
(0.034) 
0.078*** 
(0.028) 
2001 
 
0.075* 
(0.035) 
0.100*** 
(0.031) 
2002 
 
0.080* 
(0.039) 
0.102*** 
(0.036) 
2003 
 
0.123*** 
(0.045) 
0.0145*** 
(0.042) 
2004 
 
0.129** 
(0.051) 
0.0158*** 
(0.047) 
2005 
 
0.141** 
(0.059) 
0.178*** 
(0.053) 
2006 0.155** 
(0.066) 
0.198*** 
(0.058) 
Institutional fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes 
R2 
 
0.86 0.86 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.83 0.83 
Number of observations 
 
427 436 
LM test (end p-value) 
 
665.32 (<0.001) 712.42 (<0.001) 
Notes:   
Standard errors are in parentheses.      
*, **, *** Denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 4: SAT Model with Full Tuition – Top 25 Schools 
 
Variable  ln(SAT score – 50th percentile)  
ln(Tuition, fee, room and board) 
 
0.048 
(0.039) 
0.036 
(0.036) 
Lagged U.S. News rank of top 40 
liberal arts colleges 
-0.0004 
(0.0004) 
-0.0004 
(0.0004) 
Dummy of lagged U.S. News 
rank > 40 
-0.020* 
(0.013) 
-0.020* 
(0.012) 
ln(Endowment per student) 
 
0.005 
(0.006) 
 
Fixed Effects 
1997 
 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.0002 
(0.004) 
1998 
 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
0.0004 
(0.004) 
2000 
 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
2001 
 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
2002 
 
0.010 
(0.007) 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
2003 
 
0.010 
(0.007) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
2004 
 
0.017* 
(0.009) 
0.021*** 
(0.007) 
2005 
 
0.023** 
(0.010) 
0.028*** 
(0.008) 
2006 0.017 
(0.011) 
0.022** 
(0.009) 
Institutional fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes 
R2 
 
0.93 0.93 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.92 0.92 
Number of observations 
 
211 213 
LM test statistic (end p-value) 466.79 (<0.001) 457.32 (<0.001) 
Notes:   
Standard errors are in parentheses.      
*, **, *** Denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 5: Top 10 Model with Full Tuition – Top 25 Schools 
 
Variable  ln(Percent of students who graduated in the top 
10% of their high school class) 
ln(Tuition, fee, room and board) 
 
0.197 
(0.231) 
0.055 
(0.215) 
Lagged U.S. News rank of top 40 
liberal arts colleges 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
Dummy of lagged U.S. News 
rank > 40 
-0.031 
(0.072) 
-0.036 
(0.072) 
ln(Endowment per student) 
 
0.061* 
(0.037) 
 
Fixed Effects 
1997 
 
0.012 
(0.023) 
0.023 
(0.022) 
1998 
 
0.009 
(0.027) 
0.032 
(0.023) 
2000 
 
0.020 
(0.033) 
0.054** 
(0.026) 
2001 
 
0.027 
(0.034) 
0.059** 
(0.028) 
2002 
 
0.019 
(0.039) 
0.052 
(0.034) 
2003 
 
0.037 
(0.044) 
0.072* 
(0.038) 
2004 
 
0.052 
(0.050) 
0.096** 
(0.043) 
2005 
 
0.059 
(0.057) 
0.112** 
(0.047) 
2006 0.060 
(0.064) 
0.121** 
(0.052) 
Institutional fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes 
R2 
 
0.89 0.89 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.87 0.87 
Number of observations 
 
214 216 
LM test statistic (end p-value) 222.34 (<0.001) 233.83 (<0.001) 
Notes:   
Standard errors are in parentheses.      
*, **, *** Denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 6: SAT Model with Full Tuition – Bottom 25 Schools 
 
Variable  ln(SAT score – 50th percentile)  
ln(Tuition, fee, room and board) 
 
-0.141*** 
(0.049) 
-0.154*** 
(0.049) 
Lagged U.S. News rank of top 40 
liberal arts colleges 
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
0.0001 
(0.0004) 
Dummy of lagged U.S. News 
rank > 40 
0.009 
(0.013) 
0.006 
(0.013) 
ln(Endowment per student) 
 
0.003 
(0.010) 
 
Fixed Effects 
1997 
 
0.010* 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.005) 
1998 
 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.016*** 
(0.006) 
2000 
 
0.027*** 
(0.007) 
0.029*** 
(0.006) 
2001 
 
0.033*** 
(0.007) 
0.034*** 
(0.007) 
2002 
 
0.050*** 
(0.008) 
0.051*** 
(0.008) 
2003 
 
0.062*** 
(0.009) 
0.064*** 
(0.010) 
2004 
 
0.070*** 
(0.011) 
0.073*** 
(0.011) 
2005 
 
0.077*** 
(0.012) 
0.081*** 
(0.012) 
2006 0.076*** 
(0.014) 
0.081*** 
(0.014) 
Institutional fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes 
R2 
 
0.91 0.91 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.89 0.89 
Number of observations 
 
213 219 
LM test statistic (end p-value) 393.57 (<0.001) 380.49 (<0.001) 
Notes:   
Standard errors are in parentheses.      
*, **, *** Denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 33 
 
Table 7: Top 10 Model with Full Tuition – Bottom 25 Schools 
 
Variable  ln(Percent of students who graduated in the top 
10% of their high school class) 
ln(Tuition, fee, room and board) 
 
-0.659* 
(0.437) 
-0.579* 
(0.430) 
Lagged U.S. News rank of top 40 
liberal arts colleges 
-0.004* 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
Dummy of lagged U.S. News 
rank > 40 
-0.131 
(0.107) 
-0.109 
(0.104) 
ln(Endowment per student) 
 
0.155** 
(0.079) 
 
Fixed Effects 
1997 
 
0.052 
(0.046) 
0.059 
(0.043) 
1998 
 
0.016 
(0.049) 
0.049 
(0.045) 
2000 
 
0.083 
(0.059) 
0.123** 
(0.053) 
2001 
 
0.139** 
(0.062) 
0.165*** 
(0.059) 
2002 
 
0.177** 
(0.071) 
0.182*** 
(0.070) 
2003 
 
0.259*** 
(0.084) 
0.256*** 
(0.082) 
2004 
 
0.253*** 
(0.093) 
0.259*** 
(0.091) 
2005 
 
0.282** 
(0.109) 
0.296*** 
(0.105) 
2006 0.307** 
(0.121) 
0.333*** 
(0.116) 
Institutional fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes 
R2 
 
0.78 0.78 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.74 0.73 
Number of observations 
 
213 220 
LM test statistic (end p-value) 310.32 (<0.001) 313.17 (<0.001) 
Notes:   
Standard errors are in parentheses.      
*, **, *** Denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 8: SAT Model with Net Tuition – All Schools 
 
 
Variable  ln(SAT score – 50th percentile) 
ln(Net tuition with loans) 
 
0.002 
(0.016) 
0.002 
(0.016) 
  
ln(Net tuition without loans) 
 
  0.002 
(0.017) 
0.002 
(0.017) 
Ranked among top 40 liberal arts 
colleges by U.S. News 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
Not ranked among top 40 liberal 
arts colleges by U.S. News 
0.013 
(0.012) 
0.013 
(0.012) 
0.013 
(0.012) 
0.013 
(0.012) 
ln(Endowment per student) 
 
 -0.005 
(0.010) 
 -0.005 
(0.010) 
Fixed Effects 
2000 
 
-0.022*** 
(0.003) 
-0.021*** 
(0.003) 
-0.022*** 
(0.003) 
-0.021*** 
(0.003) 
2001 
 
-0.019*** 
(0.002) 
-0.019*** 
(0.003) 
-0.019*** 
(0.003) 
-0.019*** 
(0.003) 
2002 
 
-0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-0.011*** 
(0.003) 
2003 
 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
Institutional fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
R2 
 
0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 
Number of observations 
 
217 216 217 216 
LM test  
(end p-value) 
314.43 
(<0.001) 
320.28 
(<0.001) 
314.61 
(<0.001) 
320.89 
(<0.001) 
Notes:   
Standard errors are in parentheses.      
*, **, *** Denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 9: Top 10 Model with Net Tuition – All Schools 
 
 
Variable  ln(Percent of students who graduated in the top 
10% of their high school class) 
ln(Net tuition with loans) 
 
-0.092 
(0.119) 
-0.094 
(0.122) 
  
ln(Net tuition without loans) 
 
  -0.071 
(0.133) 
-0.072 
(0.136) 
Ranked among top 40 liberal arts 
colleges by U.S. News 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.0003) 
Not ranked among top 40 liberal 
arts colleges by U.S. News 
-0.072 
(0.094) 
-0.070 
(0.095) 
-0.072 
(0.095) 
-0.070 
(0.096) 
ln(Endowment per student) 
 
 0.025 
(0.074) 
 0.026 
(0.074) 
Fixed Effects 
2000 
 
-0.075*** 
(0.022) 
-0.078*** 
(0.024) 
-0.072*** 
(0.023) 
-0.076*** 
(0.025) 
2001 
 
-0.050** 
(0.019) 
-0.051** 
(0.020) 
-0.050** 
(0.020) 
-0.050** 
(0.021) 
2002 
 
-0.053*** 
(0.019) 
-0.052*** 
(0.019) 
-0.052*** 
(0.019) 
-0.051** 
(0.020) 
2003 
 
-0.010 
(0.018) 
-0.008 
(0.019) 
-0.009 
(0.018) 
-0.007 
(0.019) 
Institutional fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
R2 
 
0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 
Number of observations 
 
221 219 221 219 
LM test  
(end p-value) 
255.37 
(<0.001) 
255.54 
(<0.001) 
255.31 
(<0.001) 
255.87 
(<0.001) 
Notes:   
Standard errors are in parentheses.      
*, **, *** Denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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